Meta-realities
Meta-realities
Thursday, 20 July 2000
Darwinists believe that their view of the world is true. They argue for the scientific approach i.e. to take value-free information (facts) and by inductive logic come to valid conclusions about reality. This is said to offer knowledge that conforms to direct experience. From what is observed a way can be found to infer truths about the historical past and ultimately about origins.
Maybe only for reasons of temperament, I might doubt the supremacy of Darwinism and make the case for “meta-realities”. These would be rooted in value such as aesthetic, ethical and religious, concerned with questions of quality. These types of questions are just as important to humans as the hard facts of life. By taking on more than just the factual this thinking may point to greater truths about the world than one based on the mere constellation of occurrences, on life as one damn thing after another.
Not that I’ll argue for it here. I’m not much good at presenting an argument and have to bow to the superior faculties of others. But if I was going to make a case for meta-realities I would point to a similar notion in Kant with his distinction between phenomenon and noumenon. Facts are phenomenon, how the world appears to the senses. Noumenon is how the world really is, a meta-reality in my terms. It is a mostly hidden realm with minimal access other than through moral, aesthetic and religious impulses.
When we say that an action is right or a piece of art work is good we say so implying a truth and as such invoke a meta-reality. It is not said in a factual or scientific sense and it is important to understand that. Meta-realities do not conform to empiricism and can’t be proven in any conventional manner. They are much more spurious and given to controversy. They are more contentious and requiring of argument. Disputes take longer and are more difficult to resolve, if at all. Moreover, they need a developed sense of value in order to be cultivated in any way.
